Japan & South Korea in the Arctic

Japan and South Korea became Arctic Council observers on at the same time in 2013, and they usually get filed alongside China as "Asian observers." But Tokyo and Seoul are not the same actor.

Alma Karabeg is writing her PhD on Japan and South Korea in the Arctic at UiT The Arctic University of Norway. We get into what actually drives the engagement (it is partly nation-building), why sustainability is the frame she uses to read both strategies, and how each country handles Russia after 2022. Japan still imports Russian gas. Both had to sanction Moscow even though it does not suit their economies, and both, Alma argues, have a room for maneuver on science diplomacy that the West does not.

We finish on the Northern Sea route, Korea's bet on Busan, and a blunt recommendation: European Arctic states are not brave enough about building their own infrastructure or coordinating on what moves through their ports.

Transcript

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The interest in the Arctic is increasing, also coming from the Asian states, not only China. Today we will be covering the role of Japan and South Korea in the Arctic. And together with me, I have Alma Karabagh, an expert on exactly this. You're writing your PhD thesis on Japan and South Korea in the Arctic at the Arctic University of Norway. Alma, welcome. Thank you so much for inviting me to talk about this exciting topic. Thank you, and thank you for coming. So, um, what is very often we can see that Japan and South Korea they're grouped together. Uh, they've both been observers here in the Arctic Council since 2013, were admitted at the same time, and they often are like um categorized as this like Asian observer states, alongside China, of course. But what would you say separates Tokyo from Seoul? We can say that Japan and Republic of Korea are similar in many regards, especially because they are middle powers and they are also uh became observers in the Arctic Council at the same time. And while they are positioning themselves quite equally in the Arctic governance, there are some differences between their Arctic strategies, where for example, Japan is very much focused on international law and also very much focused on science, scientific collaboration, whereas Korea is doing the same, but still Korea is much more open about business opportunities, especially when it comes to the maritime sector, because Korea does have a very strong maritime and shipping sector, which is obviously of national interest for their own economy. So I would say that Korea is much more open about this economic and business opportunities, whereas Japan is still very much focused on Arctic science collaboration and also on obeying the law when it comes to how the science is being conducted and research is being conducted in the Arctic. You mentioned obeying the law and in relation to that. What does that mean for Japan? Well, they have in their white paper, in their Arctic strategy, articulated that this is the criteria for being involved in the Arctic. So it is just an expression which is uh let's say differs from uh just to put it into a comparison from a Chinese Arctic strategy that where China is positioning its own country as near Arctic state, now which might be interpreted in in different ways. So I think Japan is very diplomatic in its uh articulations, very diplomatic in in a way that they want to underline what actually should be obvious, but they still want to present themselves as uh posing no threat to any territorial questions about Arctic and sovereignty of the Arctic states. So I think this is uh very much a diplomatic expression for not posing any questions from the Arctic states. It's a very safe way to play. Yes, for sure. But for somebody who hasn't followed this Japan and South Korea and Asian states, you could say in the Arctic closely, what would you say is the interest? What is the drive behind the Japanese and South Korean engagement in the Arctic at large? So we have seen that very many countries, not only uh Japan and Korea, are very much interested in becoming observers in the Arctic Council. And uh we could say that this is uh a part of being in the club in a way. But then while I was analyzing both of the strategies, I did the document analysis to see what exactly do they write about, what terms do they use, what kind of items are they interested in. And then uh my conclusion is that they're actually this is a part of the nation building. So, and it's not necessarily that they do it specifically for the Arctic, because recently we have seen that they are talking not only about the Arctic, but that when they make their strategies, they also say this is strategies for the polar signs, which means that both poles are included. But when it comes to the Arctic, there are some obvious economic interests, and what is different with the Arctic is that it does have a population, there are sovereign states there, and so they are building their own national identity, for example, where they present themselves as peacekeeping nations, where they also express that they have no interest in the territory itself. So it's not the land or the resources that they're after, but they want to contribute. So they're peaceful nations that want to contribute to research and science in the Arctic. And at the very same time, because there are economic interests as well, they do bring it up, but they bring it up and present it as being a contributor. So being somebody that can contribute with science, but also with technology, with the ships, with the icebreakers. So this is more of a coming to the Arctic with a contribution and not coming to the Arctic to take something from the Arctic. So I think this is uh this is how I have been interpreting the Arctic strategies. You mentioned the Antarctic and this is like the polar uh perspective for them per se. Would you say then that the drive or wish to engage in in Arctic affairs is that unique? Or is it just a reflection that okay, we want to be both Arctic and Antarctic, just as polar nations, or is there something unique about the Arctic which drives the engagement? Well, when it comes to other things than research, then Arctic is of course of a bigger interest. Because even though the first thing that both countries mention, and very many other countries who were involved in the Arctic, is focus on science and research. So this becomes almost like a ticket to join the club of the countries who will contribute to the sustainable development in the Arctic. So science and research is, of course, very important because of the climate change, and the climate change in the Arctic is impacting both of the countries and the rest of the world as well. So this is um the starting point. And then the polar research is um something that also I would say specifically Japan is more interested in, where because they now include Antarctic, but this is what when it comes to the polar research. But then when it comes to economy and geopolitics, then Arctic has another meaning. I mean, in your research, you do focus on sustainability. It's kind of this uh is a core topic as an analytical lens for both both of the countries. So why is sustainability the right frame to look at this question of Arctic engagement? So the way that I discovered that sustainability is the core category is because I started to look at, as I mentioned, what items do they bring up when they write the Arctic strategy and in the process of making it, and how do they present it. And I've seen that they use uh different words that I coded for how how do they present interest in this research stations and shipbuilding, and then how much do they spend on their new icebreakers and ships and maritime sector and heavy investments in their ports. And then I've I've seen that they use science as one major category, and then they use economy as another, including the maritime sector and the business sectors that are of their national interests, and then they use geopolitics as a third category. But geopolitics as a category is being used exactly because there are geopolitical tensions, not only nowadays, but have been during the Cold War and so on. So this is not a new phenomenon, but they use it also to express that they pose no threat to the sovereign countries in the Arctic, and that they are very much concerned about bringing the peace. So all those things actually show that there is a focus on sustainability, that this is the driving force where they want to have a peaceful, peaceful Arctic, preserve the peaceful Arctic, and then they want to develop the Arctic, but in a sustainable way, with eco-friendly shipping and no harm to the climate. So this is uh this has been the driving force behind their involvement. And speaking of of ships and and uh practical, you could say, side of this, both countries have been stepping up uh their polar research uh fleets. Mirai uh the second is due to for delivery this autumn, and uh Cooper's next generation icebreaker uh contracted to Hanwa Ocean last summer is for delivery in 2029. It would also extend the Korean uh engagement as well. Are they competing? Uh is Tokyo competing with Seoul on who is going to kind of be the uh most prominent uh here in Arctic science, or is this more of a cooperation? Is this a different dynamic here? Well, I'd say that on looking at the market, so everybody is competing in a certain sense, but particularly regarding the icebreakers. So the icebreakers are constructed for research purposes in hope that they can be used as icebreakers, but uh it doesn't necessarily guarantee that they would uh have technological capacity or even juridical permission, legal permissions to use them for the commercial purposes. So this is uh a question to be to be uh discussed, probably in on a multilateral level, but of course also with the Russia, who has quite a long coast along the Northern Sea route. But I'd say that the in a sense, if if we think that they are competing in a way, they would be competing regarding the access to the market, and also because both countries, both the Republic of Korea and Japan, they do they do invest in their ports. So of course they would want to attract cargo going through a Japanese port rather than Korean. So so I think the competition would be in that sense, but I I wouldn't say that they are in very much direct competition. And I also see that they do also collaborate and they also have this three lateral collaboration with China. So, in a sense, I think on their own continent, they do have historical turbulences and also historically competing with each other. But when it comes to their role in the Arctic, I think they are sometimes grouping themselves because they stand a bit stronger as Asian observers together in the Arctic rather than competing, yeah, competing in the in the Arctic. You mentioned Russia supports the Northern Sea route, Northeast Passage. Russia is a factor we haven't mentioned yet, but it's a very important factor for the at least you could say business side of engagement of things. How do they navigate Russia both of these countries? Is Japan navigating Russia differently from South Korea? Do they have a similar approach? Maybe even if you could comment on what has changed after 2022 and how Russia is being um approached? Yeah, so it has changed since 2022, even though Japan is still importing gas from Russia because the the agreements are still in force. And uh I think that both Korea and Japan had to impose sanctions against Russia since 2022 because they are Western allies, but this is actually not viable for their economies. So both of the countries are very much looking forward to the moment where the the war that Russia is uh conducting against Ukraine will be stopped when so after the after the sanctions are removed, I think Korea and Japan would very much like to collaborate with Russia because they had already several projects with Russia. Like for example, Korea had a project on called Industry 4-0 on eco-friendly ships, eco-friendly vessels. So, and that project had to be postponed, cancelled due to the sanctions. So I think they their relation to Russia is being influenced because they are Western allies, so they have to follow. But if it was up to them, I think they would be more uh more diplomatic in their in their ways. And uh yeah, I think uh one of the things where Japan and Republic of Korea have shown strength in this turbulent time due to the sanctions is science diplomacy, because they have they have uh relations that they can use in order to enhance and underline the importance of science diplomacy. So I think this is easier done from Asia than for, for example, from the West or from Europe. They have like a room for many words that's very unique, very unique positions essentially. And this brings me, I think, to our next question because the Arctic Council, yes, it survived, but it's still constrained in many ways. If we look at NATO, yes, there are bigger presence in the north, we have Sweden and Finland in NATO, and also more activities in the Arctic. And also at the same time, we are seeing this increased increased interest in the Northern Sea route on Arctic shipping. So there are many things happening at the same time. And how would you say you assume the role of Japan and uh Korea to be in the future of this Arctic governance ecosystem? Yes, I think when it comes to preparing for the future, we do see that especially Korea has been investing heavily in the development of Busan Port. And the the new president is also uh being very optimistic about the use of the Northern Sea route, uh the so-called Arctic route, and there are huge hopes and plans and investments connected to this strategy. So I think when it comes to the future role in the Arctic governance and also involvement in the Arctic Council, even though Arctic Council is not an arena to make a decision, but I I think they have, first of all, a lot to contribute with because they have a lot of knowledge, they have a lot of science, they have been conducting research for a very long time in the Arctic, and both of the countries have actually very well developed technology. So I think they should be involved, they should contribute, and they also, as I mentioned, they do invest a lot themselves. And nowadays they have been moving from multilateral collaboration to bilateral collaboration. So I think for the for the future of the RT governance, I think to some point we we have to revert to the multilateral. And I think this is where both Japan and Republic of Korea have a lot to contribute with. So if you could come with a policy recommendation to a decision maker, you could say in Europe, but if you want to say to the US, that's also fine. But if you would have like some general policy recommendations surrounding the Japanese and Korean engagement in the Arctic, what would you say? What would you recommend? Well, I think for the Arctic, no, for the European states, maybe Art Arctic European states in in particular, the coastal states could coordinate better regarding the transportation route, because the the cargo will have to be stored somewhere. And I think it would be wise to coordinate better, to understand first of all, the volume of the cargo and to share the data, and to to also see who is investing in what port so that they can adjust and prepare better in Europe. Because I I also think that Europe is not so, should I say, brave to start to invest in its own uh infrastructure to be prepared for the day when the Northern Sea route, or yeah, at some point where the Northern Sea route is either being an active transport corridor or is being used to a larger extent than it is today. So I think those uh especially in the sector as shipping, maritime, port development, I think those are the sectors where European countries could collaborate to a larger extent with Japan and Korea. Thank you so much. Let's hope that the recommendation turns into action at some point. It was wonderful to have you and to learn about this. Yeah, thank you so much for inviting me and giving me opportunity to speak about my topic. And thank you for listening.